Abstract. The way people form groups when facing a coordination problem poses an interesting question. This paper addresses the issue of what type of clubs are formed when players must play a public goods game with the other players belonging to their club. I use a two-stage approach to separate network decisions and public goods decisions and apply farsighted stability to characterize the network structures that emerge and persist as a result of this sequence of stages. It is possible to establish criteria based on the player size and network parameters for determining the elements of two types of stable solution sets: basins of attraction and the path dominance core. Both solution sets provide predictions for the types of clubs that will form within the defined framework.
Introduction
A classic dilemma facing groups is the way they coordinate to accomplish goals. Often, people form groups in order to better accomplish tasks requiring a multitude of contributors. Unfortunately, strategic behavior can make coordination on the desired outcome unreliable. People must take this dilemma into consideration when they decide how to go about forming their group. Network formation provides a unique avenue in which to study this question. How do people choose the groups they belong to when trying to solve coordination games? This is the question I seek to better understand in this paper.
A classic example of a coordination game is a public goods game. Players have the option to provide a costly but desirable public good. Doing so, however, often requires or at least benefits from the cooperation of other people. Considerer a roommate game in which players must rent housing. In doing so, they must decide whether to share a house with a collection of roommates.
Doing so reduces the individual rent burden if everyone cooperates and pays their share. However, any roommate relationship has the implicit costs of simply maintaining a congenial relationship as well as a risk that the roommate will not pay their share. Given these tradeoffs, we can ask: what types of households tend to form?
The model constructed here addresses this question by formulating a network formation game in which players select a club to belong to and then participate in a public goods game with whomever else belongs to their club. This methodology allows us to address both issues of interest: the type of clubs that players form and the outcomes of the coordination game that result from the network structure. This paper contributes to a few different areas in the economics literature. It represents a new approach to thinking about how public goods are provided by emphasizing characteristics of the group providing the good. It joins the growing literature exploring the role that networks and, more importantly, strategic network formation in economics. And finally, it represents a new entry in the relatively small literature modeling both network formation and public goods.
The social coordination and public goods portion of the model is similar to many models in the public goods literature. Quintessential entries in the subject include Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) , Bergstrom et al. (1986) , Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) , and Menezes et al. (2001) which seek to characterize equilibria in public goods games under a variety of specifications. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) derive equilibria for a class of discrete public good games with continuous action spaces under two possible sets of rules: contribution rules and subscription rules. A discrete public goods game is one such that there exists a threshold of contributions needed to provide the good.
If the sum of contributions across players is greater than or equal to the threshold, the public good is provided. Otherwise, the good fails to be provided. Under contribution rules, contributions are costly even if the good fails to be provided. Alternatively, under subscription rules, contributions are refunded if the good is not provided. A limitation to this model is that the Nash equilibria supporting provision of the public good are not unique.
By comparison, Bergstrom et al. (1986) consider a public good game where contributions enter into the utility function positively so that contributions are less costly than in a typical discrete public goods game. As a result, they are able to find unique Nash equilibria. While a powerful result, the modeling assumptions place heavy restrictions on the model such that they no longer fit a large variety of public goods scenarios. Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) provide a similar analysis of equilibria with an emphasis on the core of undominated strategies. The approach taken in this paper is similar in the sense that it focusses on undominated core strategies but diverges in the precise core concept applied. This specification will be defined more precisely below. Menezes et al. (2001) follows the work of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) closely with the added incorporation of incomplete information. While the model presented below does not consider cases of incomplete information, it closely follows the complete information case presented in Menezes et al. (2001) . As a result, I am able to utilize their equilibrium existence proofs and characterizations.
As a network formation paper, this research builds on previous contributions to the network formation literature. While networks are common throughout many disciples, economic networks are a more recent curiosity. It is clear that the way in which economic agents relate to one another can have an important effect on economic modeling. However, the way in which agents strategically form their networks is likely the most valuable contribution that economics can make to the otherwise vast realm of network literature. The use of game theory to understand the formation problem is economics' comparative advantage. Examples of important and influential papers in network formation include Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , Bala and Goyal (2000) , Page et al. (2005) , and Page and Wooders (2009) . This paper is intended to continue the progress with this literature by introducing a new two-stage approach to thinking about both network formation games as well as games on a network. Additionally, this paper marks another entry into a smaller subset of network formation games often referred to as club formation. In these games, as in the model presented here, not all nodes are traditional players. Within the network there exist club nodes that play an important role in the network but do not make any strategic decisions. For an example of club networks, see Page and Wooders (2010) .
Thus far, there has been some effort towards combining public goods and networks. Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) describe a network public goods model in which equilibria are characterized in terms of maximal independent sets. This characterization has tremendous intuitive appeal as it explains free riding tendencies by identifying network properties that are conducive to transferring contribution burdens to other players. They find that certain players contribute everything while others contribute nothing and that this type distinction is based on the network. The limitation of this paper is that the networks are fixed exogenously so that it is unable to describe what types of networks can be expected to form. They are only able to characterize the contribution burdens once the network is fixed. Bramoullé et al. (2011) and Allouch (2012) both build on the findings in Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) by studying a more general setting. They establish eigenvalue based existence proofs as well as characterizations of uniqueness and interiority conditions. However, these results are still limited to a fixed network. Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005) model a network formation game that features a coordination game being played within. Agents play a two-person standard coordination game with any other players with whom they are linked. As in the model presented here, they are interested in the type of networks that form in the long run given costly links as well as the equilibria that persist in the coordination game. The paper presented here differs from this model in a few critical ways.
First, Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005) consider coordination games between only two players, or alternatively, two person clubs. I consider coordination games with clubs of arbitrary size. Second, they consider a linking process that allows all players to form or sever any number of links at any time. I, on the other hand, restrict this process as a part of the two-stage methodology. Finally, players in their model commit to a single strategy in the coordination game that they play with all other linked players. They are only allowed to change their strategy if selected to do so with an -small probability at any point in the game. By comparison, I allow strategies to be independently selected each time the coordination game is played.
Similar to Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005) , Jackson and Watts (2002) present an alternative network formation game. Under their rules, they find that networks supporting coordination on the efficient, risk-dominated equilibria tend to form over time. While an appealing result, they, too, place significant restrictions on when players are permitted actions within the coordination game.
The paper proceeds in the following way. In section 2 I outline the network formation game as well as the public goods game. Section 3 defines farsighted preferences on the network. Section 4 describes long run tendencies and stable sets. Section 5 concludes. Throughout, I make extensive use of a four-person example to motivate and illustrate the model. When possible, I will extend the four-person results to a general N-person setting.
Model
The model derived here utilizes a two-stage framework to address the issues of both network formation and coordination. Breaking the game into two stages is useful in isolating the different tradeoffs associated with each issue. The network formation component faces tradeoffs between the benefits of having more people to split contributions among and the costs of maintaining links with more people. The public goods game, on the other hand, faces a traditional game theory tradeoff between multiple Nash equilibria, free riding, and cooperation. In order to analyze each of these trade-offs separately, we divide them into different decision stages. Then, agents choose actions using farsighted optimization based on the repeating of these two-stage periods.
In the first stage of each period, agents participate in a network formation exercise. An agent is selected at random and is permitted to sever and form a new link or maintain the status quo network. This action defines the network on which the public goods game is played. Following the link formation stage, players play a public goods game with the players to whom they are connected in the network. There is an interdependency in players' decisions both within the stages as well as throughout the entire game. The networks that players choose to form are contingent on the anticipated outcomes of the public goods games played within. Additionally, the outcomes of the public goods games may depend on the structure of the underlying network. Thus, there exists a multi-period problem for the players. In order to solve this problem, we will adopt the use supernetworks and the solution concept of farsighted stability to determine how, over time, the network will evolve and what this means for the provision of public goods. To do so, we must first properly define each stage as well as the over-arching supernetwork structure.
2.1. Stage One: The Network Formation Game. Stage one consists of a network formation game. Players are connected to one another through a collection of clubs. In the network formation stage, players select which club they would like to belong to and are said to be connected to all other players belonging to that same club. The consequences of club membership will be discussed in more detail below as we define stage two.
Let the set of players be denoted by N and the set of available clubs be denoted by S. In order to allow for the possibility that players do not want to socialize and connect to other players, we will assume that the number of players is equal to the number of clubs (|N | = |S|). This allows all players to belong to a club wherein they are the only member. Primarily, this serves as a convenient way of representing a player's choice to not join a club with others. In what follows, assume that both N and S are finite.
A network, g, is a nonempty subset of player/club pairs, g ⊂ (N × S). A pair (i, s) ∈ g implies that player i belongs to club s in network g. It is worth noting that under these definitions, network g is an undirected network; a link emanating from a player to a club is identical to a link emanating from a club to a player. Both simply indicate membership. We will apply an important restriction on club membership: players may only ever belong to one club at a time. For all players i ∈ N , there exists one and only one pair (i, s) ∈ g for some club s ∈ S. Our interest is in understanding how these clubs form in the presence of a public goods game. Single club membership is the clearest way of analyzing this issue.
Throughout, we will utilize a few other notations to describe network characteristics. Let G denote the set of all possible networks generated by N , S, and the membership rule specified above. Because N and S are finite, G is finite as well. It will often be convenient to refer to a particular network among the set of possible networks. Denote a particular network k by g k where
Referring to the members of particular clubs within a network will be useful as well. Let g S(i) denote the set of clubs that player i belongs to in network g. By the single-membership assumption, g S(i) is a singleton. Let g N (s) denote the set of players belonging to club s in network g. Combining theses notations, we can denote the set of players belong to the same club
The way players form clubs is defined by a network formation rule. At the beginning of stage one in each period, a player i is selected at random from the set of players. The chosen player i is permitted to sever her link in status quo network g and form a new link. That is, pair (i, s) ∈ g is removed from the network and player i selects a new link from the action set Θ = {(i, s ) : ∀s ∈ S}.
The resulting network, g , that will carry into stage two can be expressed
Intuitively, the selected player is simply allowed to decide which club she would like to belong to in the second stage and following periods. Players not selected must maintain their links in the network and take no action in the first stage.
A convenient simplification can be made to the model with respect to the way clubs are indexed.
Clubs have no intrinsic characteristics so that the only potential difference between clubs s and s are the club members. To illustrate, a network in which player i is the sole member of club s is no different than a network in which player i is the sole member of s . Thus, we may suppress the indexing of clubs and rely solely on the measure g N [S(i)] . The benefit of doing so is that it reduces the size of G by removing all networks that are effectively duplicates. A game with N players has N ! networks in which all players belong to one-person clubs. For our purposes, these N ! clubs are all equivalent so that they can be treated as just one network. We will refer to this equivalency as network type. Network type preserves the way in which players are connected to one another through clubs while ignoring the fact that there are potentially many clubs through which they can connect in exactly the same way. The example below will illustrate this refinement in the case of four players. This network type categorization can be used to refine the set of all possible networks G to the set of all network types, G * . G * contains networks for all possible ways in which players can connect to one another but ignoring the club specific equivalencies.
The network formation problem amounts to thinking about how the club networks transition to other club networks in each period. A supernetwork (see Page et al. (2005) ) provides useful way of representing these transitions. Like a traditional network, a supernetwork is a collection of nodes and arcs where the nodes are themselves networks and arcs represent the intersection of two relationships between networks. Specifically, the nodes in the supernetwork are the networks contained in G * . That is, each node in the supernetwork is a club network type. The arcs in the supernetwork take on a very different meaning than in the club network. Supernetwork arcs are defined by the intersection of two separate arc types : move arcs and preference arcs. Move arcs reflect the feasibility of transitions between nodes in the network. There exists a move arc, denoted → M , between node (network) g ∈ G * and node g ∈ G * if is it is possible for some player to create network g from g when selected under the rules above. In this case, we write g → M g . Preference arcs, denoted → P , reflect players' preferences over nodes in the supernetwork. Because preferences will be determined in part by the second stage, we will hold off on providing a full definition of the preference arcs until later. Finally, an arc between two nodes in the supernetwork, denoted → A , exists if there is both a move arc and a preference arc between the nodes. That is, g → A g if there exists at least one player who can change g to g and prefers to do so. We will refer to these → A arcs as domiance arcs. Together, these nodes and arcs form a supernetwork G ⊂ A × (G * × G * ). Here, g D3 refers to the class D network in which players 1, 2, and 4 belong to the three-person club and player 3 belongs to the one-person club.
Suppose the status quo network is g B4 and player 1 is selected by nature to sever and form a link in the current period. Player 1 can create three possible networks: g B4 , g C3 , and g D4 . These three networks are depicted in Figure 2 (a). Alternatively, this same transition can be represented using move arcs in a supernetwork framework. Using the reasoning presented above, the complete four player supernetwork with respect to move arcs can be constructed. This network is presented in Figure 3 . This graph presents all ways agents can transition between networks. It is worth noticing that certain players cannot ever make certain transition. For example, a single player cannot ever fully transition from a class A network to a class E network without the help of others. This will be an important observation later on when we discuss farsighted dominance. Club membership is costly and this cost is assumed to be increasing in the number of members of the club. An intuitive interpretation is that this cost is an administrative burden; larger clubs necessitate greater administration.
Utility to players is, therefore, given by Case (1) reflects payoffs if the good fails to be provided while case (2) reflects payoffs if the good is provided. The game is assumed to follow contribution rules so that contributions are not refunded if the good is not provided. By comparison, subscription rules are common in the literature and relax this assumption (see Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) and Menezes et al. (2001) .) Subscription rules introduce an additional class of pure strategy Nash equilibria not present under contribution rules.
Because equilibrium selection already presents a large issue under contribution rules 1 , subscription rules are not considered here.
The game defined above has a multitude of equilibria. To make use of the game in a network setting, the number of equilibria must be reduced in order to yield a tractable set of predicted outcomes upon which players can make educated decisions of network formation choices. To meet this goal, I make two simplifying assumptions. The first is that I choose to only consider pure strategy Nash equilibria. While mixed strategy equilibria have been characterized for games of this nature (see Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) ), they are too numerous and indeterminate to provide any network insight. This assumption leaves two remaining pure strategy Nash equilibria. Figure 3 . The complete supernetwork with respect to move arcs in the four player game.
The two pure strategy Nash equilibria of this contribution game can be divided into two categories: one in which the good in not provided and one in which it is. These equilibria are
2. (Provision)
In the first Nash equilibrium, no player contributes so that the public good is not provided. In the second Nash equilibrium, players contribute exactly enough to cover the cost of the public good with the added restriction that no one contribute more than the private value of the public good.
By restricting the game to pure strategy Nash equilibria, we reduce the dimension of expected outcomes considerably. However, the remaining two pure strategy equilibria still admit an infinite number of Nash outcomes. In particular, the contribution equilibrium is not unique. In order to analyze the network formation game, players must be able to compare possible outcomes in the public goods game. Thus, we are forced to make an additional assumption in order to select a unique contribution equilibrium. In what follows, I make use of the Unanimity rule discussed in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) . Under Unanimity rules, all agents choosing to contribute contribute their fair share. Within the model, this amounts to restricting the player action set to b i ∈ {0, c |ψg(i)| }. While this is a very restrictive assumption, reducing the number of equilibria is necessary for the analysis that follows.
Club Rankings and Farsighted Preferences
Having established the stage games, we can start examining the culmination of the stages and the network formation game they inspire. Our interest is in determining the types of networks that tend to emerge and persist over time when agents are allowed to adjust the network in reaction to the outcomes of the underlying public goods game. Naturally, players prefer network structures that yield them higher levels of utility. Thus, the first critical step is forming a ranking over network structures. The public goods game can be divided into two anticipated Nash outcomes: the good is provided or it is not. Each Nash outcome exhibits a potentially different ranking of networks.
Thus, we will consider each case separately while keeping in mind that both outcomes and rankings are possible.
Rankings.
3.1.1. Case 1: No-provision. Consider a nonempty club s in network g. In the no-provision case, all agents choose b i = 0. From (1), expected utility to all players in club s is
Utility is maximized by making club s as small as possible with the optimal club size being one member.
Example 2. There are four possible clubs sizes in the four-player game: one-, two-, three-, and four-person clubs, which we will denote by s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , and s 4 , respectively. Let indicate a typical preference relation. It is easy to see that s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 when L > 0 and the no-provision equilibrium is played.
3.1.2. Case 2: Provision. Again, consider a nonempty club s in network g. When agents anticipate that the provision equilibrium will be played, they prefer to form the network that yields the highest
and
s 2 s 3 s 4 s 1 Table 1 . Four-player club rankings in the Provision equilibrium for specified parameter values.
payoffs. Using the unanimity rule, we can rewrite (2) as cannot hold for any choice of parameters.
3.2. Farsighted Preferences. Players prefer to be in higher ranking clubs. However, they are often constrained by the club networks they can form. Players may find that they cannot unilaterally form the network they would like but their actions might be critical in progressing the network towards the most desirable structure. To illustrate, consider a status quo network consisting of |N | one-player clubs and a ranking in which a single |N |-player club is most desirable. No individual is able to unilaterally form the highest ranking club network but collective action over the course of several periods could form it. If the ranking is such that every player prefers a larger club to the one they are in, myopic agents are able to form the highest ranking club. However, if this is not true, which is highly likely, standard Nash behavior is insufficient to support efficient club formation. For this reason, we look to a different type of solution concept: farsighted stability.
The concept of farsighted stability was developed by Chwe (1994) and later applied to a network setting in Page et al. (2005) and Page and Wooders (2009) . Unlike standard solution concepts, farsighted stability allows for the use of actions that may not be immediately beneficial but eventually result in a preferred outcome. Solutions in the farsighted framework take the form of stable sets in which players have no desire to adjust their strategy because any adjustment eventually results in an undesirable outcome. Farsighted stability can be applied to the network formation game.
Our interest is in identifying the networks that emerge over time and are not prone to deviations.
Farsighted stability is a very natural way to study this issue. In particular, we will look at the super network generated by the game and derive a farsighted dominance relation over the networks within.
Recall that the supernetwork G is a collection of network nodes and directed arcs between them.
An arc from g → A g exists if there is a player who can create network g from network g (g → M )
and prefers to do so (g → P g ). Having established network rankings, we can now address the preference arc portion of the super network. The preference arcs in the supernetwork represent farsighted dominance relations across feasible networks. Consider a player i belonging to club s in network g or club s in network g . Player i prefers network g to g , written g → P g , if he derives more utility from g than g . This preference is equivalent to the club size ranking from above so that g → P g if s s . Following the definition presented in Page and Wooders (2009), Definition 1. A network g indirectly dominates network g , written g g , if there is a finite sequence of networks {g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , ..., g h } with g = g 1 and g = g h as well as a corresponding sequence of players {n 1 , n 2 , n 3 , ..., n h } such that
Intuitively, g indirectly dominates g if there exits a finite path of feasible deviations wherein each player at each step along the path prefers the final network to the one in which they are called to act. The benefit of using a farsighted definition is that it allows for the possibility that players along the farsighted dominance path change the status quo network to a network they find less desirable under the belief that following players will eventually create a dominant network.
Network Formation Stable Sets
The farsighted dominance relation can be incorporated into the supernetwork by combining the set of move arcs and preference arcs into dominance arcs. A dominance arc from g to g , denoted g → A g , exists in the supernetwork if, for some player i, there exists a move arc g → M i g in the supernetwork and a preference arc g → P i g * for some farsightedly dominant network g * that will be reached as a result of the deviation to g . That is, network g is linked to g if some agent can change g into g and prefers to do so because a preferred network will be eventually reached because of the change.
Two networks g and g are said to be equivalent, denoted g ≡ g , if g g and g g.
Equivalent networks must either be the same network or rest on a circuit within the supernetwork.
If two networks g and g are not equivalent and g g , then g is said to be a descendant of g .
The concept of network descendants is a natural way to think about the networks that tend to emerge and persist within the network formation game. In particular, the notions of equivalency and descendants can be used to define two concepts of solution sets: basins of attraction and the path dominance core. Both definitions closely follow those presented in Page and Wooders (2009) .
Definition 2. A set of networks B ⊂ G * is said to be a basin of attraction for supernetwork G if
(1) the networks contained in B are equivalent and for no set B having B as a proper subset is it true that all networks in B are equivalent, and (2) no network in B has descendants.
Essentially, basins of attraction are sets of networks such that once reached, there is no tendency to transition to a network outside the basin because there are no descendants. The only potential change in network structure is to an equivalent network through cycling.
Definition 3. A network g ∈ G * is contained in the path dominance core, D, of supernetwork G if and only if there does not exist a network g ∈ G * with g = g such that g g.
The path dominance core is the set of networks with no descendants and no equivalent networks. Page and Wooders (2009) show that the path dominance core is equivalent to the set of singleton basins of attraction. As a solution concept, basins of attraction narrow the set of possible network types to a set of equivalent but indirectly dominant networks. Networks belonging to a basin of attraction are those that are likely to emerge, persist, or form infinitely often. When nonempty, the path dominance core provides superior predictions by narrowing down the set of persistent networks to unique networks that are likely to emerge. Unlike basins of attraction, the path dominance core eliminates the ability to cycle through multiple networks indefinitely.
Example 4. We can characterize the solution sets for the four-player game with the following exercise. The two Nash equilibria imply two potentially different solution sets depending on the public goods outcome predicted by the players. We will address each of these cases separately with the understanding that both corresponding solution sets are equally valid as stable predictions.
Additionally, it must be that players expect only one of the two Nash outcomes throughout the course of the game. For reasons that will become clear as the stable sets are constructed, any switching between Nash equilibria rules out stability because it changes the preference ranking over networks.
Consider first the case in which all players expect the no-provision equilibrium in all future rounds.
Example 2 establishes that the one-person clubs yield a higher payoff than any larger club. Thus, all players prefer network g A1 to any other network. In fact, g A1 g ∀g ∈ G * . Forming g A1
requires that all players sever their membership to any club with more than one member. This action is always preferred so that farsighted dominance holds trivially. g A1 has no equivalent networks or descendants because any other network requires that at least one pair of players belong to the same club, with is never preferred. Therefore, under the no-provision equilibrium, there is one basin of
is a singleton basin of attraction so that the path dominance core is D = {g A1 }. Figure 4 depicts this supernetwork with dominance arcs. Note that Figure 4 , which displays dominance arcs, is a refinement of Figure 3 , which displays move arcs. In Figure 4 , the move arcs that are not farsightedly preferred have been removed.
The case in which players anticipate the provision Nash equilibrium is not as straight forward. Table 2 presents the basins of attraction and path dominance cores for all possible club size rankings.
Several of the results are quite straight forward and follow reasoning similar to the no-provision case.
Others are less obvious and are worth examining in more detail. Proof. Letḡ be an arbitrary status quo network. Provided L > 0, s 1 s i ∀i = 2, 3, ..., n. When chosen to act, all players are able to leave their club and join a one-person club. Because of the club ranking, they prefer to do so. Thus, there exists a sequence of networks {g 1 , g 2 , ..., g h } with g 1 =ḡ and g h = g {1},{1},...,{1} such that each transition g k−1 → {k} A g k involves player k forming a one-person club. Now, g k−1 → {k} M g k holds trivially and g k−1 → {k} P g h by the club ranking so that g h = g {1},{1},...,{1} g 1 =ḡ. Becauseḡ is arbitrary, g {1},{1},...,{1} has no descendants and is in a basin of attraction. Furthermore, g {1},{1},...,{1} farsightedly dominates all other networks, making it the unique member of any basin of attraction. Therefore, B np = {g {1},{1},...,{1} }. Finally, B np is a singleton so that D np = {g {1},{1},...,{1} } Proposition 1 establishes the intuitive result that when players expect the good to never be provided, they do not form clubs with other players. There is no benefit to sharing the burden of a good that will not be provided so they remain alone.
The more interesting case, however, is when players expect the provision equilibrium. As was illustrated in Example 4, there are several types of stable sets that can emerge based on the club rankings. Sometimes the highest ranked networks are in a basin of attraction, other times they are not. The following propositions establish criteria under which each of these cases occur.
Conjecture 1. Let G be a supernetwork of an n-player game with a club ranking such that the optimal club size is s * and let players expect the provision equilibrium. If n is evenly divided by s * (i.e. n/s * = a ∈ J where J is the set of natural numbers) then the unique basin of attraction is made up of a class of networks in which all players belong to a s * -person club.
Proof. To be added.
Conjecture 1 shows that when all players can be divided evenly into optimal group sizes, players form networks where everyone belongs to clubs that yield the highest payout. Additionally, this gives a criteria for when efficient networks are formed if we consider maximal payouts a measure of efficiency. The following conjecture establishes the solution sets for networks that are not evenly divisible among optimal club sizes.
Conjecture 2. Let G be a supernetwork of an n-player game with a club ranking such that the optimal club size is s * and let players expect the provision equilibrium. Suppose n is not evenly divided by s * and let r be the remainder once players have been divided into s * clubs. (i.e. Let a ∈ J such that n = as * + r and r < s * .)
(1) If there does not exist club size s * +q where q ∈ {1, 2, ..., r} such that s * +q s p for any p ∈ {1, 2, ..., r}, then a basin of attraction contains networks with the maximum possible number s * -person clubs.
(2) If there does exist a club size s * +q such that s p s * +q , then the basin of attraction does not contain networks in which the maximum number of s * -person clubs are formed.
Conjecture 2 establishes criteria under which efficient networks form. As was seen in example 4, agents not belonging to an optimally sized club may form larger clubs if the larger clubs are more desirable than the smaller clubs that remaining players can form on their own. This provides a simple criteria for determining if players will form efficient networks. When players form excessively large clubs in this way, it allows for the possibility that total welfare across all players is lowered.
The gain to the remaining players after the initial division into s * sized clubs of joining the s * -person clubs may be less than the loss to the other players as a result of this deviation. In this case, the welfare implications of unequal optimal club sizes are not ideal. This behavior can be interpreted as a type of free riding. Players may form inefficiently large clubs to avoid making larger contributions in smaller groups.
Conjecture 3. Let G be a supernetwork of an n-player game with a club ranking such that the optimal club size is s * . Only the n-person club network and the one-person club network can be contained in the path dominance core.
Conjecture 3 shows that the path dominance core can only ever be made up of two network types: one-person club networks and n-person club networks. This conjecture follows from the observation that finding the basins of attraction amounts to finding the farsightedly dominant class of networks. All networks in a class are equivalent and therefore have descendants if there are more than one network in the class. Thus, the only possible singleton basins of attraction are the singleton classes: one-person club networks and n-person club networks Taken together, these propositions and conjectures provide characterizations of the types of networks that are likely to emerge given parameters and Nash equilibria. Recall that the public goods game has two Nash equilibria. Thus, the actual network formation game has multiple basins of attraction. In the full supernetwork, the solution set consists of the basins of attraction and path dominance cores for both the provision case and the no-provision case. Fortunately, this simply requires that the two solution sets be combined: B = B N P ∪B P and D = D N P ∪D P . Prior to making an assumption about the belies of players, we can still narrow expected networks to a collection of stable sets. The specification of beliefs simply narrows that set down even more.
Conclusion
This paper establishes a new type of network formation game where players are engaged in a public goods problem. By using a two-stage approach, we are able to break the game into a series of intuitive propositions establishing solution sets and their relation to efficiency. While the stylized assumptions are restrictive, the model provides useful insight into the way people group up to provide public goods. Given a set of parameters, basins of attraction and path dominance cores can be determined and provide an understanding of the networks that are likely to form.
The framework provided here represents an initial foray into this two-stage approach to network formation. Further research could continue in one of several possible avenues. Games other than public goods games could be analyzed with this approach, which has the intuitive appeal of have a backwards induction type procedure in a network setting. Alternatively, the public goods game itself could be better studied in an attempt to relax some of the the restrictive assumption and model a more robust economic environment. In either case, the network formation approach presented could prove valuable in future research.
